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does not thereby cause harm or impose undue risk of harm to others in specified ways.
Each person also has the complementary moral right not to be harmed by others (and not to suffer imposition by others of undue risk of harm) in these specified ways. Moreover, each person at the onset of adult life is the full rightful owner of herself.
Legitimate ownership encompasses a range of entitlements down to bare entitlement to access. Full ownership includes a bundle of entitlements. If one fully owns a thing, one has the right to use it as one chooses so long as one does not use it in ways that violate other people's rights not to be harmed, the right to exclude all others from using it, the right to allow others to use it on terms one sets, the right to lend the thing to another on mutually agreeable terms, the right to waive, temporarily or permanently, some or all of one's rights in the thing, and the right to transfer some or all of the set of rights just mentioned to another person via gift or contract on any mutually agreeable terms. These various ownership rights are enforceable. One has the moral right to issue standing conditional threats to others who might be tempted to violate any of one's ownership rights in the thing. The conditional threats take the form, "If you (attempt to) violate my rights, I'll retaliate, and so you'll be worse off." (The right to force or coerce is limited by a proportionality constraint, so that one may not threaten to impose a cost on another person in order to induce her to respect one's ownership right if this threatened cost is disproportionate to the loss one would suffer if the right is violated. 7 )
In this tradition moral rights are rights one has independently of institutional arrangements, cultural understandings, and anyone's opinions or attitudes. A moral right involves enforceable duties owed by other people toward the right-holder. For example, 4 the content of Smith's right to walk down the street is given by the duties of all other people not to interfere in certain ways with his walking in that place.
Right-wing libertarianism affirms that from the premise of self-ownership plus other plausible premises one can show that by exercising their natural moral rights individuals can appropriate and acquire private ownership rights in parts of the external world and that ownership of property established in this way can be substantially unequal. Indeed the right-wing libertarian holds that there is no per se moral limit on the extent of inequality of individuals' property holdings.
Left-wing libertarianism combines affirmation of libertarian self-ownership with egalitarian claims about world ownership. Full ownership is exclusive: if one person has full ownership of a thing, no one else has any ownership rights in that thing. Since each person includes just one distinct body, the thesis that every person is the full exclusive rightful owner of herself is evidently compatible with the further claim that persons can legitimately acquire full exclusive ownership of unequal amounts of the material world, there being no limit to the extent of inequality of ownership that may legitimately arise.
The left-libertarian holds that it is just as true that the claim that each person is the full rightful owner of herself is compatible with any extent of moral limits on the degree to which persons can acquire unequal ownership of unequal amounts of parts of the material world. Moreover, the underlying moral values of individual freedom and personal autonomy and sovereignty are best served by the combination of individual selfownership and egalitarian world ownership. So says the left-libertarian.
I agree that individual self-ownership and egalitarian world ownership are compatible theses-both could be true together. I suspect that this combination of views 5 is not coherent. By this I mean that the best rationale for individual self-ownership is opposed to the best rationale for egalitarian world ownership. 8 But among the many rationales that might be advanced to support a claim, it is hard to show which one is best, so best rationale incoherence is hard to establish definitively. A more tractable issue is this: Self-ownership rightly-that is to say, broadly--conceived includes constraints on acceptable views on world ownership. Self-ownership is a doctrine of individual freedom. It holds that the earth, the material world apart from the bodies of persons, is available for the use of persons on fair and equal terms. What these fair and equal terms are is a matter of dispute, but self-ownership limits the range of possibly acceptable positions. In particular, the terms of eligibility for ownership of parts of the earth cannot discriminate in favor of personal traits that some self-owning persons possess and other do not. 9 To take an uncontroversial example, what I shall call the broad idea of selfownership rules out as inadmissible the following regime of private ownership: persons with white skin may acquire private property in parts of the earth and persons with black skin may not. This discriminatory regime would have the effect of undoing the freedom of self-ownership: denied the right to acquire property, persons with black skin would have to give up self-ownership rights in exchange for being allowed access to air to breathe and land to stand on in order to ensure bare survival.
Narrow self-ownership, the idea as understood by left-libertarians, is compatible with its being the case that some persons have no right to breathe the air they need to live or to stand on the any place on earth or elsewhere in the universe or even to occupy with their bodies the physical space that their bodies must occupy. The three just-mentioned rights are rights over parts of the world separate and distinct from human individuals, so 6 whatever rights (narrowly conceived) human individuals have over themselves will not stretch to cover these or any other parts of the world. In a broad sense, self-ownership involves the right of each of us to live as she chooses, and this vague right includes some rights to use the physical world in ways that are prerequisite to living.
Self-ownership also includes rights against certain sorts of incursions by other people. If I impinge on your body by hitting you, pushing you (from some location where you have a right to be), or carrying out activities that by design or as unintended side effect cause physical damage to your body, your self-ownership rights are infringed.
There are questions about how exactly to delimit rights against such incursions. For example, does self-ownership include a right that no one engage in activities that involve a risk, however small, of generating physical damage, however small, to your body? We intuitively do not suppose that people have rights against incursions that are so strict, but it is not clear how one sets the boundaries of rights against incursion in a principled way that does not compromise the core idea. 10 I set these issues aside, despite their intrinsic interest, as not germane to the central concerns of this essay.
THE OTSUKA PROPOSAL
Otsuka affirms a libertarian right of self-ownership that incorporates these two rights:
(1) A very stringent right of control over and use of one's mind and body that bars others from intentionally using one as a means by forcing one to sacrifice life, limb, or labour, where such force operates by means of incursions or threats of incursions upon one's mind and body (including assault and battery and forcible arrest, detention, and imprisonment). How might this go? We might characterize thick self-ownership as the combination of the generic libertarian principle of freedom with self-ownership. The former says that each person is morally free to do whatever she chooses with whatever she legitimately owns provided she does not thereby harm others in specified ways. There is a standard list of types of harming that fills out the specification. The self-ownership claim says that each person is the full rightful exclusive owner of herself.
This won't do. The stated combination rules out neither egalitarian constraints on world ownership nor moralistic constraints on personal behavior that involves some slight world ownership. One can insist that people are free to do whatever they like with whatever they legitimately own, but it is a further issue, not yet resolved, on what terms individuals should have entitlements to use resources such as air or other parts of the earth. Egalitarianism and moralism propose terms for such entitlements. Plausible or implausible they may be, but neither proposal is in conflict with the stated combination.
The following suggestion is better. To self-ownership as previously characterized we add the generic libertarian principle of freedom in a simpler construal: Each person is morally free to do whatever she chooses provided she does not thereby harm others in specified ways. The person who engages in nonheterosexual sex, gambling, and so on, does not harm anyone in any of these ways, at least when her incidental usage of nonscarce resources in carrying out such acts is clearly not depriving anyone of anything to which she has a claim based on libertarian natural rights. Likewise the person who appropriates a plot of land and works on it to gain benefits for herself when land is nonscarce is arguably doing what clearly harms no one in any way a libertarian moral theory ought to recognize as wrongful harming. The appropriator in these circumstances is not depriving anyone of anything to which she has a claim based on libertarian natural rights.
We might alternatively treat the idea of self-ownership as initially indeterminate so far as its implications for morally acceptable world ownership are concerned. We then try to make progress in understanding the notion by introducing constraints on its interpretation. Here are two plausible constraints:
1. When parts of the material world are nonscarce, each person is morally permitted to appropriate as much of these resources as she likes and to use them in 13 whatever ways she chooses provided she does not by such uses cause harm to nonconsenting others (in certain ways that violate their natural moral rights).
2. The moral rules that regulate appropriation of parts of the material world do not discriminate among persons on the basis of their personal traits. The quantity and quality of resources one is permitted to appropriate do not vary depending on such facts as whether one has black or white skin color, is fat or thin, is talented or untalented, is physically attractive or unattractive, is male or female, or old or young.
Both of these constraints on the interpretation of the norm of self-ownership are violated by the Otsuka proposal for permissible appropriation that is supposed to show how libertarian self-ownership is compatible with egalitarianism in the distribution of material resources across persons. However, the constraints are plausible, if one's project is to elaborate a version of Lockean libertarianism that (1) is normatively attractive and (2) can stand as a reasonable interpretation or extension of Locke's own texts so that the label "Lockean" is appropriate.
What is normatively attractive is subject to debate. I here simply record my own impression of what is appealing in Locke's doctrines that the Otsuka proposal excludes.
The basic Lockean ethic holds that people are not naturally subject to the authority of other persons but are free to live as they choose (within uncontroversial constraints) and free to acquire private ownership of resources given that this ancillary freedom is necessary if people are to be free to carry out any of a wide range of reasonable aims and projects that people in fact regard as centrally important for their fulfillment. This vague ideal of personal freedom can be construed as compatible with the existence of some minimal duties to rescue other people from dire predicaments, but the mere fact that 14 others are worse off than you and would benefit from your laboring for them does not suffice to generate an enforceable moral duty that you labor on their behalf. This vague ideal already incorporates the idea that--in some sense to be explored--one's freedom includes the freedom to use parts of the earth without obtaining the consent of other persons and without laboring for them as a condition on permissible use and permissible appropriation of the parts.
OTSUKA MODIFIED
One might seek to render the Otsuka proposal more appealing by adding a Pareto norm to it. This norm would hold that appropriations otherwise ruled out as inadmissible by the proposal are permissible provided they would improve someone's condition without worsening anyone else's condition. So in the world of abundance containing two persons, one able and one unable, isolated so that neither can by his actions affect the condition of the other for better or ill, Able is permitted to appropriate and develop as much land as he likes even though these actions render him far better off in welfare than Unable. So far, so good.
However, this set of principles still lacks normative appeal. Consider a variant of the previous example in which Able can bestow the fruits of his labors on Unable. The latter benefits a tiny bit from every transfer from Able, but Able must labor for thousands of hours in order to generate one unit of utility for Unable, whereas he can gain a samesized unit of utility for himself by laboring for just a few seconds. To sustain equal opportunity for welfare (utility), Able is permitted to appropriate land and work it for his own benefit only on the condition that for each acre of land he appropriates and works for himself, he must appropriate and work tens of thousands of acres on behalf of Unable. To be fair, it should be noted that Otsuka does not deny that egalitarian world ownership can drastically crimp a person's real freedom to live as she chooses in some possible or even likely circumstances. He is concerned to argue that in some possible circumstances egalitarian world ownership would be compatible with a robust, more than merely formal self-ownership for all. He describes an example in which unable persons are assigned ownership of ocean front property and able persons are permitted to own inland property, the rules being set so that the able can survive without working for the benefit of the unable but are glad to work for them in exchange for obtaining access to the beach, and equal opportunity for welfare obtains for all without anyone being forced to labor for others, because the consequences of declining to work for the benefit of others would not be intolerable for anyone who so declines. Turning back to the modified proposal, I note that it would allow appropriation that leads to unequal, even extremely unequal, opportunity for welfare, if able persons happen to prefer not appropriating land and sharing the fruits with the unable except on terms that disproportionately favor themselves over the unable. In this scenario, the outcome in which no appropriations occur is Pareto suboptimal compared to the alternative outcome in which appropriation occurs and the fruits go mainly to the able.
SELF-OWNERSHIP WITH RELAXED WORLD OWNERSHIP
What happens to the Otsuka doctrine if we retain its strong self-ownership element but relax its world ownership component in the direction of Lockean common sense? This is a vague question. Let us suppose for purposes of illustration that we affirm that people have common ownership rights to breathe the air and stand on parts of the earth and wander through the earth freely as hunter-gatherers, and that they also have the right to appropriate land and work the land and acquire full private ownership of the land and resources on the land that they improve by their labor. We suppose this right to acquire is limited by a familiar Lockean Proviso, the details of which we can leave aside. 16 What then? The unsurprising answer is that even if we assume that people end up acquiring roughly equal amounts of property by appropriation and labor, the selfownership component of the doctrine all by itself can generate unlimited inequality of ownership. Suppose that in an economy of small (roughly equal) property owners, some persons are beautiful, and others will pay to look at them; some can solve complex mathematical problems, and the others will pay to be informed of the answers; some are able to run fast and perform astounding athletic feats, and others are willing to pay to watch these performances; and so on. These are all inequality-generating scenarios, rooted in people's unequal possession of talent. Even if it were the case that unequal talent to work and improve land were not a significant source of inequality, and only people's unequal talents to work their own minds and bodies (supposing all have air to breathe and space to place their bodies without running afoul of stringent equal world ownership requirements), still, in the Otsuka utopia in which all comply perfectly with the moral principles governing self-ownership and (relaxed) world ownership, there is no in principle limit to the amount of inequality that might legitimately arise. Some might live like kings and queens, while others must make do with brutally short lives in squalid conditions. Suppose these possibilities became actual.
The imagined inequality-via-self-ownership runs afoul of principles that hold that when sheer luck showers good on some and evil on others, some sharing of luck is morally mandatory. One such principle holds that it is morally bad if some are worse off than others through no moral fault or moral demerit of their own. Another holds that if some are significantly worse off than others, and seriously badly off, through no moral fault or moral demerit of their own, redress is morally required.
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The left libertarian, who has been persuaded that Otsuka world ownership is an extreme and unattractive doctrine, and accepts a relaxed Lockean view, and then is asked to contemplate inequality-via-self-ownership as just described, might respond in broadly one of two ways. She might say that her doctrine on self-ownership is meant to hold only in some range of circumstances, in which insistence on self-ownership does not generate morally jarring inequality. This would be in effect to renounce self-ownership regarded as a bedrock moral principle. She might alternatively dig in her heels and insist that morality mandates private ownership of self come what may, whatever the consequences.
To my mind the latter response is beyond the pale.
REJECTING THE CORE OF LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM
The core left libertarian impulse is to reconcile the norms of self-ownership and egalitarianism of some form with respect to world ownership. The root intuition is that both norms are morally compelling, so if one can develop a set of principles that Peter Vallentyne offers a sensible response to the criticism that self-ownership wrongly encumbers each of us with a moral right not to participate in easy rescues and not to acquiesce in takings of one's body parts for charitable purposes however small the 21 cost to oneself and however great the benefits that could be secured for others. He notes that self-ownership concerns only enforceable obligations, so consistently with stoutly affirming full self-ownership one might hold that it would be morally a very good thing, though not obligatory, for each of us to contribute to easy rescues. Or one might hold that it is morally obligatory to contribute to easy rescues, but the obligation is not legitimately enforceable. Finally, he notes that if one accepted a moral duty of easy rescue, its fulfillment would tend to swallow up individual liberty, because in the unfortunate actual state of this world, huge numbers of people are in dire predicaments, from which they could easily be rescued. Once one sees the possibility of rescuing distant needy strangers, acceptance of a duty of easy rescue or moderately easy rescue will be recognized as oppressively infringing on one's right to live as one chooses: morality including the rescue duty would require spending the vast bulk of one's life helping others. 19 These points do not succeed in defending the self-ownership thesis from the easy rescue objection. What is objectionable is precisely the idea that there is no enforceable obligation to help save lives when the cost to the potential helper is low or moderate. If the world multiplies opportunities for rescue, then the overall cost to the rescuer (in terms of foregone opportunities) of saving all who might be saved is rising, and eventually rises to a threshold such that engaging in further rescue efforts will be deemed excessive by most people. 20 In other words, it is built into the idea of a duty of easy or moderate rescue that the cost to the rescuer must not be "excessive." (The scare quotes here acknowledge I have no theory as to how one draws the line in a principled way that indicates where the duty gives out.) Vallentyne might respond that if the number of 22 potential rescuees vastly exceeds the number of rescues any individual is obligated to undertake, how can there be a strict obligation owed to any particular persons? One answer is that the obligation is disjunctive: one must rescue some subset of the total of people whom one might save, and each of these persons has a right that one rescue either a group that includes him or some other same-sized group from among those who might be saved.
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Here the damaging problem with self-ownership does not lie in its denial that there is an enforceable obligation to keep helping needy persons so long as there is a net utility gain from doing so, but rather in its denial that there is an enforceable obligation ever to help others in need no matter how enormous the gains to the others and how slight the cost to the helper. Left libertarianism in its own way echoes Hume's view that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the rest of humanity to the slightest scratch on one's finger. These implications of self-ownership offend against two norms that any reasonable philosophy of individual liberty should be tailored to fit. One is that paternalism-restriction of a person's liberty against her will for her own good-is morally acceptable at least when it would prevent an individual from causing great harm to herself without generating any compensating gain for others. The other is that a nonretarded noncrazy human person, possessing rational agency capacity, has a dignity that demands her own respect as well as the respect of others. Each such person is under a (vague) enforceable duty to herself to live as befits a rational agent, and in all but desperate circumstances this duty dictates that she owes it to herself to fashion something 24 worthwhile from the one life she has to live, to generate good for self and others and to abide by reasonable moral constraints. The vague duty to oneself leaves enormous scope for free choice of how to live one's own life, but not unlimited scope. The permissibility of paternalism and the existence of a nonwaivable duty to one's status as a rational agent entail that the self-ownership doctrine rests on a misunderstanding of the ideal of personal sovereignty and its limits. 23 Once again, Vallentyne develops sensible rejoinders whose limits are instructive. 24 Regarding the implication of self-ownership that says that each person is As is well known, Locke himself explicitly disavows such extensive and absolute rights of personal autonomy that include rights against coercive interference. Locke does not regard the individual human being as the full rightful owner of herself; rather she is God's property. 25 The individual has no right to kill or destroy herself, so she cannot transfer such rights, that she does not possess, to other agents. The individual cannot legitimately submit to a voluntary slavery contract that makes another person the full rightful owner of the initially self-owning individual. Nor according to Locke may an individual transfer her rights to life and liberty to a would-be absolute political sovereign.
Belonging to God does not deprive the Lockean individual of all control rights over herself. Each human person has the moral right to direct her life as she chooses within the constraints of God's laws, which forbid self-destruction and wastefully imprudent conduct and permanent alienation of one's rights over oneself to a human master. So it's not merely that the individual does not possess full rights over herself.
Even the limited rights over herself that she does possess, as it were rights of tenancy over herself that are subordinate to God's ownership rights with respect to her person, may not be squandered at will or whimsically or in any other way that is contrary to God's purposes for man.
The left-libertarian might dispute the significance of Locke's religious beliefs to the project of drawing from Locke's texts insights that should inform our ideas on personal freedom and autonomy today. Scratch the theological premises from Locke's writings, perhaps, and you end up with a doctrine more recognizably and consistently libertarian. I don't think so. The limits on the individual's absolute rights over herself that Locke formulates in terms of God's sovereignty and divine purposes can be restated in terms of respect that we owe ourselves in virtue of our status as rational (semirational) agents and solidarity that we owe to fellow humans and other animals. Moral claims that
Locke derives from theological premises can be taken as freestanding intuitively plausible claims. This secular trimming of Locke is abetted by his view that God's purposes for humanity mainly involve the desire that His creatures flourish, and that the Divine commands we ought to obey take the form of rules general compliance with which would maximize human flourishing. 26 According to Locke, God has given no one rights to property except with the proviso that He has also given "his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods."
Locke adds: "Charity gives every man a title to so much out of another's plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise." 27 duty of charity might amount to. In fact, one might hold that the rest of the sentence from which this quotation was drawn specifies the duty to preserve the rest of mankind in purely negative terms-refraining from impairing the life or the "Liberty, Health, Limb, or Goods of another." But this interpretation has its problems. For most of us do not think that the duty to refrain say from seriously injuring others by bashing them holds only when abiding by this duty is compatible with one's own preservation. One must abide by serious moral constraints even if that means accepting one's own death: I may not kill you just because that is necessary to save my own life. In any event, it would be odd to hold that when one has extra goods, one must give them to save another from a dire predicament, but deny that when one has extra time and energy, and could easily act to save another from a dire predicament, one is not morally bound to do so.
If the commentators who read Locke as endorsing a strict duty of charity are correct, then Locke, the supposed true believer in full self-ownership, believes no such thing, but instead allows that other people sometimes have property rights in our bodies, when our bodies are useful for extricating them from dire predicaments and the cost to us of doing the extricating is not excessive.
In The left-wing objection against the Lockean Proviso is that it arbitrarily allows whoever happens to be in a position to assert a first ownership claim on hitherto unowned land to gain virtually all of the benefits that are generated by the establishment of any of a wide variety of ownership regimes that would enable people to gain secure control over pieces of the earth for extended periods of time. Suppose one individual appropriates all unowned land as his property and uses the property in ways that offer economic opportunities to other people that just barely fully compensate them for the loss of the not very valuable rights to use the land freely that private ownership supersedes. The
Lockean Proviso puts a stamp of approval on such an appropriation. But intuitively this seems unfair. Since the free use rights are likely to provide very little benefit to anyone, a very low baseline level of benefit is set, and provided the compensation the single world appropriator provides generates this little benefit for all affected people over the long run, the appropriation is assessed as perfectly permissible by the Nozick Lockean Proviso.
Some right-wing libertarians will respond to the objection by digging in their heels and standing their ground. I want to explore a response that concedes ground to the objection without retreating all the way to egalitarian world ownership doctrines such as the left-libertarian affirms.
The concessive response holds that a person may legitimately claim full private ownership over a hitherto unowned portion of the earth even when such tracts of land are scarce provided these conditions hold:
1. Over the long run no one is rendered worse off by this appropriation than she would have been had the land remained under free use (and people generally had conformed to the moral rules of free use).
2. Over the long run each person affected by the appropriation is rendered substantially--though not necessarily equally--better off than she would have been had the land remained under free use (and people generally had conformed to the moral rules of free use).
3. Over the long run each person affected by the appropriation is rendered substantially though not necessarily equally better off than she would have been had the free use system been replaced by any egalitarian regime of property ownership. Under an egalitarian system ownership rules are set so that each person can obtain an equally valuable set of material resources, or a set of resources ownership of which induces equality of condition, or a set of resources ownership of which induces equal opportunity to gain as much via ownership as all other owners gain.
31
These conditions reflect and extend the conditions that Locke seems inclined to impose on appropriation of parts of the earth as private property when scarcity obtains.
When these conditions obtain, and appropriation occurs, a wedge is driven between the left libertarian critique of private ownership and the affirmation of principles of world ownership that insist on equality in some form in the left libertarian manner.
I don't in this essay make any further attempt to adjudicate the complicated and 31 . Here I am simply assuming that policies and actions that will bring about good consequences as picked out by the right principles of outcome assessment will coincide with policies and actions that merit the description "left-wing." To argue for this, I
would need to defend a standard for evaluating consequences and show that producing good consequences so understood requires left-wing not right-wing policies in actual and likely circumstances.
